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These three books contribute to the debate around the post-human, a topic that finds 
its roots in philosophical anthropology and its focus on the theorist-philosophical 
implications of the changes in human nature generated by technology. The debate on 
the meaning of the post-human that developed in the late 1990s is a useful 
framework for discussing Posthumous Life, as well as Luigi Pellizzoni’s and Davide 
Tarizzo’s books. Evidently, the term ‘post’ implies the concept of ‘the human’: the 
idea of human nature is the starting point for any consideration of the post-human. 
Jami Weinstein and Claire Colebrook analyse and discuss the conceptions of the 
post-human, which constitutes the background of all three works, for example, Nick 
Bostrom’s version, according to which post-humanism is
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a beneficial extension for humans, and Katherine Hayles’s view of the post-human
as the dispersion of all the qualities that we once took to be human. Colebrook takes
into account, beyond these two dominant conceptions, many other theories which
deal with philosophical anthropology in a post-human landscape: Giorgio
Agamben’s, Gilles Deleuze’s and Jacques Derrida’s, but also the authors who
lay the foundations of the post-human thinking: Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx and
Charles Darwin.
Colebrook shares Hayles’s critical approach to ‘the human’ rooted in the classic
Cartesian pattern of a cognition-oriented subject, characterised by mindfulness,
connectedness and self-organising dynamism, as described in her former book,
Death of the PostHuman (2014). In Posthuman, Colebrook has brought to light how
the concept shares the structure of nihilism: the negation of the privileged position
of man in the world gives rise to a fetishisation of the post-human world as a
manless world. Therefore, in the post-human thinking we have but a repetition of
the idea that the human extends, surpasses and supplements itself, an old form of
residual humanism, rather than a valid solution to the post-human problem.
In their quest to inaugurate an anthropology in which humans definitively
renounce their privileged position, Weinstein and Colebrook reveal the need to
transform post-human into the posthumous. This is no easy matter: the authors
specify that the theoretical transformation is necessary, yet impossible (p. 6). The
difficulty of overcoming the artificial human/post-human dualism is resolved by
means of a ‘reconfiguration of the forces’ from which the question of human nature
emerges. This means a ‘critical study of life’.
Posthumous Life collects fifteen chapters dealing with the complex, multiple
senses of the post-human, enlightening them in play and in tension with one
another. The book has four sections, each taking on one location where the question
of ‘life’ is articulated. ‘Posthuman Vestiges’ illuminates the porous and permeable
border between humans and animals in order to criticise the post-humanist theory,
which continues to perpetuate a humanist hierarchical opposition between non-
human animals and humans. The second and third sections – ‘Organic Rites’ and
‘Inorganic Rites’ – focus on the theme of inhuman rites. The former investigates
the ‘organic others’ to avoid the theoretical anthropocentrism in the conceptual-
isation of animals following in Derrida’s footsteps. ‘Inorganic Rites’ takes up the
‘inhuman’, namely the inorganic, technological sub- and supra- personal form of a
traditional life-conditioned approach.
The book uses a variety of lenses in order to highlight the differences or the
absence of differences between ‘human’ life and other forms of life, even other
non-living things, all the while trying to avoid the classical post-human approaches.
The discovery of this new terrain of analysis leads to interesting perspectives on
political issues, such as the investigation of political physiology beyond subjec-
tivity (Protevi, p. 211) or the idea of personhood explored in relation to political
subjectivity, as exposed in its performative power and use in relation to animals
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(Hunt, p. 179). Other essays deal with classical philosophers who gave new impetus
to the development of research around subject and subjectivity, such as Judith
Butler (Hekman, pp. 65–83) or Derrida (Lippit, pp. 87–104; Nealon, pp. 105–135).
By highlighting the question of ‘the human’ from the point of view of the
deconstruction of the ‘subject’, the posthumous approach opens a new perspective
on subjecthood. The inclusion of a whole range of other dimensions to the subject
illuminates the interweaving of the human and the non-human and produces a more
inclusive ontology. The human becomes, in the posthumous perspective, just an
interface and interconnected being, a combination of networks and living systems
that comprise a single world of computers, digital media, animals and things.
Weinstein and Colebrook’s solution to the ‘current state of disturbance’ of the
human succeeds in overcoming humanism completely and conceptualising life
beyond the human (and even beyond ‘this earth’). However, the authors remain
within the humanistic conception, which sees the human as always defining itself
dynamically and dialectically in contrast with nature. The opposition human–nature
and the dominant character of the human are linked with a humanistic anthropology
that overlooks the former trinitarian anthropology, which identifies a substantial
link between human and nature, both opposed to transcendence.
Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Posthumous Life, the terrain for clarifying what
post-human, posthumous and transhuman are, is that of life. The challenge of a
‘posthumous’ interpretation of ‘human’ has brought into question ‘life’ –
understood as the last vestige of humanism. Tarizzo’s book, published in 2010 in
Italy and now translated into English, deals precisely with this topic.
Tarizzo shows how the idea of ‘life’ – which embraces the variety of ‘the
living’, thus making ‘human’ an indistinct part of it – is a ‘recent invention’. The
author intends to unveil ‘the invisible ontology’ behind the generally accepted
concept of ‘life’. According to Tarizzo, the concept of ‘life’ stems from the
theoretical elaboration of ‘autonomy’ as linked to the advent of modernity. Despite
its date of birth – which is not identical with the Cartesian moment, so important
for Weinstein and Colebrook – Tarizzo finds the premises of the Kantian idea of
autonomy in Augustinian anthropology and its break with classical philosophy that
leads to the idea of will. Will puts humans in a vertical relation to God. He writes:
‘Humans can choose along will’s vertical axis, that is the axis of their individuality
… The more one rises, the more voluntas, i.e. one’s individuality, is strengthened,
is consolidated, furthering the supreme and sovereign will of God, in which the
human will is reflected’ (p. 18). Given this theoretical assumption, the first to
theorise autonomy was Immanuel Kant via the noumenal man, defined as ‘pure
will’, separate from the phenomenal man, who has a concrete existence and a
specific will, and who is inevitably contaminated by desire.
Because of this separation, philosophical anthropology is ‘split’ between
universal subjectivity and different forms of subjectivity, namely concrete subjects.
The contrast between a concrete man and his humanity ensues: this is the ‘theorem
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of modernity’ (p. 48). The two separate spheres are not, according to Tarizzo,
unrelated: the idea of humanity is ‘unreachable’ because it is based on autonomy,
which reveals itself as void of content. The idea of autonomy forms the theoretical
premise we need to underpin the category of life.
The central chapter of the volume is entirely dedicated to the complex problem
of ‘life’ as a category, explored by German philosophers such as Gottlob Fichte,
G.W.F. Hegel and Friedrich von Schelling. Schelling has a more radical view of the
distinction between an autonomous life and different forms of life. He considers
‘life’ as completely undetermined, as an ‘original being’ or ‘living foundation’.
Extrapolated from the concrete forms of living, life is an empty will of life, an
empty will of oneself (p. 90), similar to autonomous pure will. At the same time, a
very similar concept of ‘life’ is progressively spreading in the naturalistic thought
of the eighteenth century, culminating in Darwin’s idea of ‘natural selection’.
‘Life’ acquires the same characteristics as its metaphysical form: as freedom of
the autonomous will, it is absolute and empty and ‘becomes a white flag, devoid of
any sign’ (p. 193); life ‘comes to offer protection and orientation to our freedom
‘‘from’’, giving it the (ineffable) semblance of that strange freedom ‘‘to’’, that is the
freedom to Live’ (p. 194). Life replaces freedom, assuming its unlimited and empty
structure (the life that wants itself). Thus the philosophical discourse on
anthropology transmigrates definitively ‘in the Biology Departments’. (p. 50).
The political result of this displacement is ‘biopolitics’, whose tragic emblem
are the Nazi extermination camps. Tarizzo illustrates the relation between National
Socialism and Darwin’s philosophy, in particular concerning the category of ‘life’
that the Nazi ideology saturates and distorts. He also highlights the most recent
theories inspired by Darwin’s categories, namely those of Daniel Dennett and
Georges Canguilhem, who manage to escape the metaphysical mortgage of pure
will. Dennett affirms the superiority of cultures which show more ‘plasticity’, in
other words the (Western) culture of autonomy in its most up-to-date and powerful
form. Canguilhem’s thought is analysed in relation to the concept of health as a
‘dynamic expression of life’ that leads to the coincidence of health and freedom,
constructing a new categorical imperative, an ‘unconditional’, that deprives man of
his humanity. Analysing the major Italian theorists who have dealt with biopolitics,
Tarizzo highlights Agamben’s legal interpretation (homo sacer) and Roberto
Esposito’s political interpretation. Neither captures the metaphysics hidden in the
category of ‘life’. For Tarizzo, the reconstruction of the ‘hidden’ metaphysical
premises that shape ‘life’ is a strategy for ‘getting out of modernity’: the critical
analysis helps liberate us from the contradictions of ‘life’.
Pellizzoni’s book provides a political interpretation of the ‘ontological turn’,
while discussing many issues covered by the authors of the two volumes analysed
above. In particular, he focuses on the crisis in anthropology – ‘is there any such a
thing as the human?’ – trying to evaluate the political significance of the
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interconnectedness of the human and the non-human, which is exactly what the
studies contained in Posthumous Life consider to be a positive effect.
The starting point is the ‘ontological turn’ in social theory, limited to a particular
object: the idea of nature. The analysis begins with very concrete questions about
the characteristics of and limits to human intervention in the biophysical world,
emerging from debates about carbon markets, geo-engineering, biotechnologies
and human enhancement. Pellizzoni points out that, compared to its traditional
understanding, ‘the mastery of nature’ now refers to a subtler strategy of
domination. From the beginning, Pellizzoni investigates the theoretical background
of the ‘new mastery’ and embarks on a detailed analysis of the ‘ontological turn’,
which also includes the idea of human nature.
In a basic sense, the ‘ontological turn’ refers to the broad reaction to the ‘post-
modern’ approach in the social sciences and philosophy. The most significant
feature here is the opposition to the linguistic interpretation of reality, which views
it as a social construct mediated by culture and language, providing different and
equally effective representations of the world. Opposition to cultural constructivism
does not mean that the ‘ontological turn’ leads to a ‘realist’ position, according to
which social research must analyse reality, adopting methodological approaches
from the so-called ‘hard’ sciences. Although ‘realism’ and ‘constructivism’ appear
to be two very different approaches, Pellizzoni emphasises a common fundamental
quality: both are grounded in a binary logic that keeps separate the knowing subject
and the known reality, i.e. subject–object, culture–nature, agent–structure, mind–
body, organic–inorganic, animate–inanimate, reality–representation, epistemic–
ontological. Pellizzoni highlights the fact that the traditional meaning of the
‘mastery of nature’ depends on a dualistic logic: domination exists between an
active subject and a passive object, for example, domination of mind over body, of
culture over nature and so on.
The ‘ontological turn’, then, distances itself from such dualisms and criticises
the implied principle of domination. The rejection of the traditional binary logic
entails a new, positive understanding of indeterminacy as underpinning an
increasing interaction – or blurring – of the human and the non-human, the real and
the virtual, the natural and the artificial. Does this also lead to overcoming
domination? Or, said differently: what are the political consequences of the
‘ontological turn’? This is the question that the book raises.
Among the many scholars engaged in the ontological turn, Pellizzoni carefully
and interestingly addresses four strands and individual perspectives. The first is
Neil Smith’s and David Harvey’s Marxism; the second is feminist new
materialism; the third is actor network theory, especially Bruno Latour’s recent
contribution; the fourth is Paolo Virno’s philosophy of the human. Certainly,
Pellizzoni’s choices are not random, although the grounds for the choices are not
made explicit. I think the reason is that all these theories share a common
opposition to the domination idea, both in relation to nature and in relation to
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human (nature). All of them claim, indeed, that emancipation and liberation from
domination is grounded precisely on a non-dualist ontological perspective.
Pellizzoni’s aim is to demonstrate that the political results of the ontological turn
may not be emancipation and liberation, but a new form of domination: a ‘new
mastery of nature’.
Let us consider how Pellizzoni argues for his thesis via his analysis of feminist
new materialism. Central to his treatment is Karen Barad’s work, which, drawing
on both poststructuralism and Niels Bohr’s physics, accounts for materiality as a
constant flux and contingent presence – what Derrida calls ‘a matter without
presence and substance’ (p. 97). The lack of a distinction between world and
thought, subject and phenomenon (Barad defines phenomena as ‘ontologically
primitive relations’ (p. 98) where the components intra-act) leads to the
disappearance of the agent. The agent becomes part of the phenomenon. Similarly,
for Colebrook, ‘matter is differential, rather than substantive’ (p. 99). Thus,
similarly to the new Marxist view, feminist new materialism also eliminates the
difference between human and nature. According to Pellizzoni, the outcome is a
new version of vitalism, which ‘represent(s) the epitome of the ontological turn’ (p.
101).
The post-humanist standpoint thus fails precisely in its claim of emancipation
and liberation. New materialism transfers the emancipatory potential to matter and
leads to a post-humanist perspective based on the idea that domination depends on
a ‘centred notion of subject’ and that its overcoming will have an emancipatory
effect. Pellizzoni points out, however, that this outlook comes dangerously close to
the neoliberal understanding of subjectivity, where the dominated subject
(allegedly) no longer exists. ‘The neo-liberal agent finds in having no substantive
core or stable centre the opportunity for an endless selfreshaping and expansion,
through a proprietary interaction with a surrounding environment understood as
equally fluid and indeterminate’ (p. 104). Latour’s actor–network theory also yields
results quite compatible with this.
Following thus analysis, Pellizzoni raises the fundamental question: What are
the political consequences of the ‘ontological turn’? What are the results of
‘ontological politics’? For him, the answer is clear: the lack of natural limits and
the negation of any residual externality of nature pave the way to an unprecedented
dominative thrust, which cutting-edge social theory is ill-equipped to detect and
address. Here resides the most important point of Pellizzoni’s analysis. Indeed, he
operates with concepts drawn from Carl Schmitt’s political theory, and specifically
the relationship between the metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges – in
this case, the interconnection of nature and society – and the form of its political
organisation (Schmitt 2005). The disappearance of a clear distinction between the
social and the natural is the metaphysical expression of the neo-capitalist order.
A crucial outcome of ‘ontological politics’, then, is that it undermines the critical
capacity inherent in a normative definition of human nature. On this point,
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however, Pellizzoni leaves Schmitt’s perspective behind and takes a more
philosophical route. The need to recover the distinction that separates the human
from the non-human, without falling onto the old dualistic scheme of the mastery of
nature, leads Pellizzoni to turn to philosophical anthropology, and more precisely to
Heidegger’s interpretation of technique and nature. According to Pellizzoni, Martin
Heidegger’s description of technology depicts ‘with amazing accuracy the new
mastery of nature…. and the ambivalence of postconstructionist accounts of human
agency’ (p. 154). Pellizzoni recovers from Heidegger’s anthropology the idea that
the human being is distinct from, yet not superior to, the animal: the ‘thrown’
condition of human existence, its opening to a concealment, differentiates the
human being from other forms of life, without giving the former a dominant
position – thanks to the critique of every metaphysical foundation. On this basis
Pellizzoni seeks to lay the foundations of ‘critical humanism’, which he opposes to
the ‘metaphysical underpinning of current anti- or post-humanism’ (p. 164). What
Pellizzoni does not seem to consider, however, is the independence of history and
the event character of the being-in-the-world, namely the ambiguity of the
Heideggerian anthropology. Indeed, Heidegger’s anthropology opens itself up to
being filled with political accounts that can also deny human nature, which leads to
a willingness to adapt and accept any political circumstance (such as NSDAP)
(Lo¨with, 1984).
The second step in the philosophical path of the book is linked to epistemology
and in particular Theodor Adorno’s critical theory. The theoretical merit of critical
theory is that the world can be thought using concepts not in a dominative manner
but rather conscious of the fact that they are set in contingent, always revisable,
constellations. The theoretical force of negativity is a common feature of Heidegger
and Adorno (p. 190).
Close to Heiddegger’s and Adorno’s critical theory, Agamben’s thought
outlines, for Pellizzoni, how it might be possible to act without being caught by
the logic of neoliberal capitalism and thus respond to the question of ‘what to do
here and now’ (p. 221). This question is central to the whole book: ‘Is the value of a
theoretical elaboration proportional to its ability to disclose concrete alternatives?’
(p. 221). Agamben’s philosophy reveals new theoretical and practical perspectives,
especially through the development of the notion of ‘impotentiality’. To sum up,
given his complex analysis of Agamben’s critique of modern ontology and its
Christian theological roots, Pellizzoni stresses that ‘impotentiality’ may trigger the
deactivation of the neoliberal approach to the world and subjectivity. The
Franciscan form of life, the expression of ‘impotentiality’ where rule and life are
inseparable, is the paradigm of another ‘form of life’. The care of the self,
necessary to achieve a state of perfection, is not ‘self-mastery’ in a dominative
sense, (p. 216) but rather in the sense of indistinction and fusion, key to overcoming
(‘deactivating’) the neoliberal paradigm of operativity (p. 217).
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That Agamben’s critical approach can outline a way out of the unwitting alliance
of the ontological turn with current capitalist domination is, however, doubtful:
Franciscan indistinctness and fusion of life and rule is, indeed, the result of the
‘imitation of Jesus’. It is not a ‘critical humanism’: Christ is the core of an
anthropology rooted in faith and love, the only anthropology fit to develop a clear
distinction from nature (Arendt, 2002).
The reference to Christian anthropology can be useful to start thinking of man
not as a subject and not even as a will. Indeed, Augustin refuses explicitly the idea
of self as a subject and points out the experience of love that exceeds and oversteps
it: love and knowledge are not in the mind ‘ut in subjectum’ (De Libera, 2015).
Pellizzoni’s and Tarizzo’s books deal with the Christian roots of humanistic subject
without considering Augustine’s critical point of view. However, the trinitarian self
who loves, wills and knows could offer a wider perspective for thinking the human
beyond the dominant humanistic subject, thus giving a new meaning to Weinstein
and Colebrook’s Posthumous Life. Pre-humanistic anthropology, still not suffi-
ciently engaged with, can give important stimuli to rethinking the human after
humanism.
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